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Relationship Loans and Information Exploitability in a
Competitive Market: Loan Commitments vs. Spot Loans
Abstract
Despite the numerous benefits of loan commitments, only 79% of the commercial and industrial loans are
made under commitment. I show that two factors limit the use of loan commitments. First, because banks
commit themselves to lend, they carry costly liquidity reserves to meet their obligations. Due to liquidity
costs, the interest rate on commitment loans is high relative to spot loans. Second, high interest rates
trigger moral hazard. If the bank expects a profitable relationship in the future, it can absorb a portion of
the liquidity costs to reduce the interest rate and attenuate moral hazard. If not, the borrower cannot get a
loan commitment.
JEL Classification Codes: G21, D45
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A loan commitment gives the commitment buyer the right to sell its debt to the
bank at a prespecified price over some preestablished time interval. The contract
stipulates the various fees which must be paid over the life of the commitment
1, a formula
for calculating the loan interest rate, and the conditions under which the bank can revoke
the commitment. In particular, every loan commitment contains a Material Adverse
Change (MAC) clause which gives the bank the right to refuse to make the loan if the
borrower’s financial condition or future business prospects deteriorate over time after the
contract is signed.2
Loan commitments are widely used in the economy. A recent Federal Reserve
statistical release (E2 - June 2000) shows that 79% of all commercial and industrial
lending is made under commitment contracts (approximately $787 billion). Moreover, as
of March 31, 2000, outstanding (unused) loan commitments of U.S. corporations have
grown to $1 trillion 564 billion
2 up from $743 billion in 1990.
Due to their widespread use, loan commitments have received considerable
attention in the literature. Two important questions have been addressed: Why do loan
commitments exist?
 (Kanatas (1987), Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1987), Thakor and Udell
(1987), Thakor (1989), Maksimovic (1990), Berkovitch and Greenbaum (1990),
Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia (1991), Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1993),
Houston and Venkataraman (1994), Shockley (1995) and Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein
(1999)). How should they be priced? (Thakor, Hong and Greenbaum (1981), Thakor
(1982), Greenbaum and Venezia (1985) and Melnik and Plaut (1986)). On the first
question, the essence of what we know is that loan commitments are a contractual
mechanism for optimal risk sharing when borrowers are risk averse and future interest
rates are random; even under universal risk neutrality, loan commitments may still be
used to attenuate moral hazard or resolve pre-contract informational asymmetry. On the
valuation question, the principal insight is that loan commitments can be priced as put
options where the borrower’s debt is the underlying deliverable.
While the current literature improved our understanding of loan commitments
considerably, there are still some stylized facts that remain unexplained.
First, despite the numerous benefits of loan commitments described in the
literature, a significant fraction of commercial and industrial (C&I) lending (20%) is3
made with spot loans (loans made without prior commitment). The theory suggests that
loan commitments prevent market failure when spot loans are ineffective in resolving
information problems. In other words, commitment loans are used when spot loans are
infeasible. However, there is no theory that explains the split between commitment loans
and spot loans when both types of loans are available to borrowers.
Second, although a large percentage of C&I lending is done under loan
commitments, this percentage is smaller for floating rate loans and short-maturity loans
(except in the first quarter of 2000; see Figure 1). There is no theory that relates loan
maturity to whether or not the loan is made under commitment.
[Figure 1 goes about here]
Third, according to the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on
Bank Lending (1988), borrowers view the guarantee provided by a loan commitment
against being rationed as the most important reason for buying loan commitments. The
literature on the existence of loan commitments assumes that these contracts carry a fixed
interest rate and rationalizes them as a protection against interest rate uncertainty and as a
tool to attenuate moral hazard at high interest rates. However, more than 80% of loan
commitments are marked to market rates and do not provide any protection against the
rate fluctuations
3. Moreover, the evidence indicates that loan commitment buyers are
more concerned about the unavailability of loans than the level of interest rates. In
support of this argument, Figure 2 shows that the percentage of C&I loans made under
commitment is highly correlated (correlation coef. is 0.67) with the level of banks’
lending standards. In other words, a tightening in the spot market leads to a greater
takedown from loan commitments.4
[Figure 2 goes about here]
Based on these facts, I address the following four questions in this paper.
•  How do we explain why risk neutral banks do not sell loan commitments to all
borrowers despite all the benefits of loan commitments described in the
literature?
•  Among those borrowers that purchase loan commitments, what determines the
choice between borrowing in the spot market and taking down a loan under
commitment?
•  How do we explain the demand for loan commitments in terms of protection
against credit (quantity) rationing?
•  What is the relationship between the loan’s maturity and the choice between
spot vs. commitment borrowing?
I address these questions in a setting where borrowers do not have
collateralizeable assets and high interest rates create asset substitution moral hazard in the
sense that borrowers prefer risky negative-NPV projects to safe positive-NPV projects
when their loan interest rate is sufficiently high. The basic idea behind how my analysis
addresses the first question is as follows. When banks sell loan commitments, they are
legally obliged to make credit available even in states in which they have insufficient
funds
4. This implies that they have to keep idle reserves to make sure that they can meet
their obligations. Idle reserves are costly for various reasons. First, depending on the size
of the bank, 5 to 8% of a bank’s assets are kept as cash. Hence, there is the opportunity
cost of foregone interest. Second, even when the bank purchases treasury securities, the5
shareholders are still unhappy because of the double taxation of the interest income.
Third, the availability of liquid reserves to the bank’s managers aggravates the agency
problems within the bank [Myers and Rajan (1998)]. I refer to these costs as “liquidity
costs”.
The bank cannot recoup these costs immediately by charging a high interest rate
because this would make the borrower prefer the socially-dominated risky project.
However, if the bank obtains proprietary firm-specific information about the borrower
during this initial phase of their relationship and this information is exploitable in the
future, the bank can expect to extract rents from the borrower by using its informational
advantage relative to other lenders. The incumbent bank and the borrower can share these
informational rents. If these expected rents are sufficiently large, the bank can absorb the
costs of carrying liquidity reserves to the point where it makes zero expected profit ex
ante. The borrower’s commitment loan interest rate is grossed up to reflect the rest of the
liquidity carrying-costs as long as this rate is still low enough to induce the borrower to
prefer the desired safe project. When information exploitability is low and these rents are
not enough to cover the bank’s liquidity-carrying costs, a relatively larger fraction of
these costs needs to be reflected in the price of the commitment loan which then
precipitates moral hazard as the borrower prefers the risky project at this relatively high
interest rate. When the bank knows that the borrower will choose the risky project, it
refuses to lend with a loan commitment because the project has negative NPV.
On the second question, note that if the borrower does not have sufficient wealth
to compensate the bank for the liquidity costs before it takes down the loan, the interest
rate on a commitment loan has to compensate the bank for liquidity carrying costs. A spot6
loan, in contrast, is free from these costs because a bank makes a spot loan only if it has
sufficient liquidity. Therefore, a spot loan is always cheaper than a commitment loan. The
advantage of a commitment loan is that it provides a funding guarantee while the
availability of a spot loan is uncertain ex ante. For that reason, borrowers prefer spot
loans over commitment loans when credit is available in the spot market.
To address the third question and explain the insurance aspect of loan
commitments, I assume that if the incumbent bank is in a liquidity crunch, it is possible
for the borrower to get a loan from a competitor bank. However, there is always a
positive probability that the borrower will not be able to find a loan immediately, even at
a cost. The reasoning is that all banks in the spot market are subject to liquidity shocks
and it may take a while for the borrower to find a bank with sufficient liquidity. In a
competitive product market, a delay in investment is costly for the borrower because a
competitor may take the project and steal the borrower’s first mover advantage.
Therefore, a loan commitment is valuable to the borrower because the funding guarantee
prevents investment delays and allows the borrower to capture the full potential of its
investment.
Now, consider the fourth question. To establish the relationship between loan
maturity and whether the loan is made under commitment, I claim that the longer the
maturity of a loan, the more time the bank has to investigate the borrower and acquire
exploitable information. In other words, when the bank lends with a short-maturity loan,
it is less likely to obtain exploitable information about the borrower during that short time
interval. The crucial assumption behind this argument is that either the bank does not
have a prior relationship with this borrower or the bank’s prior experience with this7
borrower does not provide any hints about the borrower’s current project. The low
information exploitability means that the informational rents generated during the bank-
borrower relationship will be insufficient to overcome the bank’s liquidity-carrying cost
to the extent necessary to keep the borrowing rate low enough to make the borrower
prefer the safe project; thus the bank will refuse to lend with a loan commitment and we
will observe a broader use of spot loans.
A. Literature Review
In my model, credit rationing arises from two sources. First, the bank has a cost of
carrying liquidity. Second, there is asset substitution moral hazard. Asset substitution
moral hazard creates a need for bank loans and liquidity costs determine the choice
between spot loans and commitment loans. Credit rationing due to moral hazard has been
addressed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) in their analysis of a credit market with adverse
selection and moral hazard. In the case with moral hazard, the main idea is that a
borrower with multiple investment opportunities switches from safe projects to risky
projects at high interest rates because interest rates affect the borrower’s return from safe
versus risky projects differently. The increase in the borrower’s riskiness can reduce the
bank’s expected return as the interest rate increases and the expected return can be
maximized at an interest rate level below the market-clearing rate
5. Boot, Thakor and
Udell (1987, 1991) and Boot and Thakor (1991) show that loan commitments can prevent
rationing by mitigating those problems. The bank can offer the borrower a sufficiently
low interest rate to deter moral hazard. However, the bank suffers a loss when it lends at
a rate below the market interest rate. To compensate the bank, the borrower pays a8
commitment fee when the contract is signed. Because this fee becomes a sunk cost when
it is paid, it does not affect the project choice. However, these papers do not explain how
loan commitments provide insurance against rationing. Insurance is the protection
provided to the policy holder against an adverse event. Deductibles and other contract
terms may reduce the likelihood of the event by forcing the policy holder to take
precautions; but in the end, there is always a positive probability that the adverse event
will occur. With loan commitments, the adverse event (rationing) is completely
eliminated and there is nothing left to insure against. Therefore, the insurance-against-
rationing aspect of loan commitments is not obvious in these models.
I differ from this literature in two respects. First, I show that a loan commitment
has no advantage over spot loans in attenuating moral hazard and dealing with the
resulting credit rationing when the bank-borrower relationship is sufficiently long rather
than a one-time-only transaction. Similar to my results, Petersen and Rajan (1995)
showed that spot loans in long-term relationships can attenuate asset-substitution moral
hazard by subsidizing the borrower at the beginning and recovering the subsidy later in
the future by extracting a share from the project’s surplus by exploiting the informational
advantage acquired during the initial phase of the relationship relative to other lenders.
With these findings, it is not clear why borrowers would prefer loan commitments as
insurance against rationing when the alternative is a long-relationship spot loan. This is
clarified by my analysis. The advantage of loan commitments is that they provide a
guaranteed source of funds that the spot credit market is unable to provide at a cost.
Second, in the relationship banking and loan commitment literature [e.g., Sharpe
(1990), Rajan (1992), Petersen and Rajan (1995), Yafeh and Yosha (1995)], the9
incumbent bank always has an informational advantage over competitors. By introducing
varying degrees of exploitability of the information the bank has about the borrower, I
allow competing banks to sometimes be in a situation in which the incumbent bank’s
information exploitability advantage is insufficient to keep the borrower.
In addition, I explain why short-maturity loans are less likely to be made under
commitments. This issue has not been addressed in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model;
Section 3 explains how information exploitability affects the contract choice; Section 4
presents the empirical implications of the model; Section 5 discusses the important
assumptions of the model and Section 6 concludes.
I. The Model
A. Projects and Payoff Characteristics
 I assume a three-period risk-neutral world with four points in time: {-1, 0, 1, 2}.
The events at date –1 will be described in the next subsection. At date 0, there are two
types of borrowers: good or bad. Good borrowers can choose either a safe or risky
project. (See figure 3 below). Both projects cost I0 dollars. A safe project pays out S1 at
date 1 and the risky project pays out R1 with probability p and 0 with probability (1–p).
Furthermore, when the safe project concludes at date 1, the good borrower can invest IS
in another safe project that returns S2 at date 2. On the other hand, when the risky project
concludes and if it is successful, the borrower can invest IR in a safe project that pays out
R2 at date 2. Projects of bad borrowers return nothing. I assume that the commonly-10
known prior probability that the borrower is good is θ ε (0,1)
 6.
[Figure 3 goes about here]
I also make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1:
(i) S2 + S1 – IS – I0 > 0; the safe project has positive NPV
(ii) p(R2 + R1 – IR) – I0 <0; the risky project has negative NPV. The bank does not
want to finance the risky project.
(iii) pR2 = S2 > pIR = IS; the future projects have positive NPV and have the same
expected return and investment no matter which project is chosen at date 0 
7.
(iv) IS > R1 > S1; the borrower will need additional funding at date 1.
B. Information Structure
Borrowers with no initial wealth and no collateralizeable assets
8 look for
financing at time –1. Neither borrowers nor banks know any borrower’s type at that time.
It is, however, common knowledge that a borrower is good with probability θ. Borrowers
learn their types at time 0. I also assume that cash flows and the project choice are
unobservable to and unverifiable by outsiders. That is, the good borrower cannot write
contingent contracts to signal its type.
Bank loans are the only source of financing. All banks are identical. Although
borrowers learn their types at time 0, banks continue to be uninformed; at date 0, a bank
only knows that a borrower is good with probability θ. If a bank lends to a borrower at
t=0 and starts a relationship, it can learn that borrower’s type at date 1. This assumption is11
in accord with the literature on relationship banking that a bank learns significantly about
the borrower during its relationship. (See, for example, Diamond (1991), Rajan (1992),
Berlin and Mester (1992), Shockley (1995), Blackwell and Winters (1997), Longhofer
and Santos (1999)).
 I also assume that the information about the borrower that the bank will acquire
during the relationship will be exploitable in the future with probability φ. Information is
considered exploitable if it provides the bank an informational advantage in the final
period relative to other lenders. So, if competitors learn the borrower’s type at time 1, the
incumbent bank’s information does not provide any competitive advantage although it is
still valid information about the borrower. How the competitors learn the borrower’s type
is exogenous to the model. Other banks that the borrower has relationship with, financial
analysts, bond-rating agencies are plausible information producers.
Finally, note that when the bank lends to the borrower in the second period, this is
a clear signal to other lenders that the borrowers is good. I assume that the borrower
cannot prepay its loan and switch to another lender due to prepayment penalties.
Figure 4 summarizes the information structure.
[Figure 4 goes about here]
C. Lending Process and Contract Availability
I assume that the borrower takes down a short-term loan each period
9. The loan at
time 0 can take two forms: a loan taken down from a commitment made at time –1 or a
no-commitment spot loan. The third-period loan at time 1 is a spot loan. I will explain
later that there is no need for a loan commitment in the final period.12
If the borrower decides to use a spot loan at time 0, it borrows I0 from the bank
and promises to repay D1,S at date 1. If the borrower decides to use a loan commitment at
time –1 to fund the project at time 0, it borrows the same amount but the commitment
stipulates the borrower’s repayment obligation at time 1 as D1,LC. The price charged on
the loan commitment is different from the price charged on the spot loan due to the costs
associated with the use of loan commitments. These costs will be introduced
momentarily. Note that at time 0, a borrower who owns a loan commitment can either use
a spot loan or the commitment to get I0. Finally, I assume that S1>max[D1,S ,D1,LC]
10. That
is, the good borrower always has enough cash at time 1 to pay off the initial debt. After
the debt repayment, I assume that the borrower keeps a fraction γ of the remaining cash
flow of the first project as dividend, reinvests the rest in the third-period project and
borrows (IS − (1−γ)(S1−D1)) to bring the total investment to IS. I will endogenize the
dividend payout ratio, γ, later.
Finally, the third-period spot loan is priced as follows. If the bank loses its
informational advantage at time 1, it has to price the third-period loan competitively. In a
risk-neutral world where the risk-free rate is zero, perfect competition corresponds to an
expected return on loans of M=1. If the bank retains its private information,  it can charge
a monopoly rate such that its expected return on loans is M>1. As in Petersen and Rajan
(1995), I will call M the market power of the bank.
The bank’s liquidity availability at time 0 is random. That is, the bank will have
enough reserves to lend to the borrower with probability qb or it will be in a liquidity
crunch and ration credit with probability (1 – qb)
11. Note that I am ruling out the
possibility that the bank could obtain liquidity from the Federal Reserve’s Discount13
Window. This is a sensible assumption because the Federal Reserve strongly discourages
repeated visits to the Discount Window. A bank with frequent liquidity problems may be
scolded or perhaps subjected to rigorous examination or told to stay away from the
window until its affairs are in order. Therefore, if the bank is not legally required to
provide liquidity to the customer, it will choose to not lend in a liquidity crunch state.
Yet, the incumbent bank has the option to carry liquidity from time –1 to time 0 by
incurring a cost of $C. This is the cost of keeping idle liquidity reserves. A bank that
carries liquidity is always able to lend at time 0. However, as I will show in the next
section, banks do not carry liquidity unless they are required to do so by a legally
enforceable loan commitment. If the borrower does not purchase a loan commitment and
is rationed by the incumbent bank in the spot market, it can immediately find another
bank with probability qm. I assume that qb≥qm
12. Given these probabilities, the funds
needed for the first project will not be immediately available to the borrower with
probability (1−qb) (1−qm) if it decides to wait to borrow from the spot market. However,
if the borrower looks for financing long enough, it can always find a bank with sufficient
liquidity. The intuition is that spot market rationing in reality is likely to only affect the
timing of the project rather than whether it is undertaken or not. In a competitive product
market, however, timing is a critical variable. If the borrower does not take the project, a
competitor may come in and the borrower may lose the first-mover advantage. To capture
this idea, I will assume that if the project is delayed, the borrower can get only a fraction
(1−α) of the original value. The cost α is dissipative and increasing in the product market
competition.14
Then, the advantage of loan commitments is that they provide a guaranteed source
of funds and prevent investment delays
13. Their disadvantage is that they are more
expensive than spot loans because of the liquidity-carrying costs. So, the borrower’s
contract choice is based on the trade-off between the funding guarantee of loan
commitments and the better interest rate deal of spot loans.
The bank faces the following problem in pricing a loan. When the bank picks an
interest rate for the first period loan, it must take into account the possible losses from
lending to bad borrowers. A high interest rate, on the other hand, can distort the
borrower’s incentives and make it choose the risky negative-NPV project.
The next section shows how spot loans and loan commitments deal with this
problem.
II. Contract Choice
In this section, I investigate how the information exploitability parameter, φ,
affects the effectiveness of spot loans and commitment loans in attenuating moral hazard.
I initially analyze the spot loans and then the loan commitments.  In both cases, I start the
analysis by examining the events at date 2 and move backward in time.
A. Spot Loans
Let’s initially assume that the borrower has chosen the safe project in the second
period and now it is in the third period. I’ll come back to the moral hazard problem and
the project choice at time 0 when I discuss the second period.15
At time 2, the end of the third period, the bank earns $M from each dollar lent at
time 1 if the information is exploitable and $1 if the information is not exploitable and the
loan is priced competitively. Given the exploitability probability φ, the bank’s expected
revenue per dollar at time 1 from the third-period lending is (φM+(1–φ)). Its profit is
obtained by subtracting the cost of the loan ($1) from the revenue. That is, the bank
makes an expected profit of φ (M – 1) from each dollar lent in the third period. Because
the total lending in this period is $(IS − (1−γ)(S1−D1)), the bank’s expected profit is
bank
3 Π = φ (M – 1) (IS − (1−γ)(S1−D1)) (1)
Note that the bank’s revenue is the borrower’s cost. Therefore, at time 2, the
borrower’s profit is
borrower
3 Π =S2 – (φM+(1–φ)) (IS − (1−γ)(S1−D1)) (2)
Now, let’s go back to the second period. The initial second-period loan is priced
in such a way that the bank makes zero expected profit at time 0.
( ) [ ] 0 , 1 1 , 1 ) )( 1 ( ) 1 (     I D S I M D S S S = − − − − + γ φ θ (3)
The left-hand side of (3) is the bank’s expected income from the relationship at
time 0, if the borrower is good with probability θ. The right-hand side is the cost of the
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Based on the assumption that a fraction γ of the first project’s remaining cash
flows is paid as dividend, the borrower’s total expected profit from the use of a spot loan
at time −1 is
borrower
S , 1 − Π =θ () ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 b m q q − − −α  (γ (S1 - D1,S)+ borrower
3 Π )
                  = θ  () ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 b m q q − − −α  (S1+S2 – 
θ
0 I
− IS)( 4 )
where () ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 b m q q − − −α  is the expected share of the profits that can be retained by the
borrower given the positive probability that spot credit may not be available immediately
and the project may be delayed. The θ term is outside the parenthesis because the
borrower does not know its type until it invests in the project. Also note that (4) does not
depend on the information exploitability probability, φ, and the payout ratio, γ. The
intuition for the first observation is that in a risk-neutral world where the bank always
makes zero expected profit, any wealth transfer to the bank due to increasing
exploitability is reflected in the first-loan’s face value as a lower price. Hence, the
borrower is indifferent to changes in the exploitability probability. Similarly, a high
payout ratio increases the third-period borrowing and the bank’s expected profit in that
period. Due to the bank’s zero expected profit condition, this increase is exactly offset by
a reduction in the price of the second-period loan. Therefore, the borrower is indifferent
to the payout ratio.
The discussion so far assumed that the borrower chooses the safe project.
However, this is true only if the bank correctly sets the interest rate at date 0. The17
borrower will choose the safe project over the risky one if the repayment obligation of the
first period loan, D1, is such that:
[] R S I M D R R p I M D S S )) 1 (   ( )) 1 (   ( 1 1 2 1 1 2 φ φ φ φ − + − − + ≥ − + − − + (5)
The left hand side of the (5) is the borrower’s profit with the safe project. The
bank loses its informational advantage with probability 1−φ, and when this happens the
borrower pays the competitive rate M=1 on the third-period borrowing
(IS − (1−γ)(S1−D1)); otherwise, it pays M>1. Similarly, the right-hand side is the
borrower’s profit with the risky project. Also note that, both types of projects are subject
to liquidity crunch risk. Therefore, the probability of credit availability q does not appear
in the equation.
By using Assumption 1 (iii) and (iv) and rearranging (5),
p
pR S





, 1 1 (5’)
(5’) shows that the repayment obligation of the initial loan has to be less than D1,B
to induce the borrower to take the safe project. Note that my previous argument on the
borrower’s indifference to the payout ratio is valid as long as the borrower can be
induced to take the safe project in the second period. As I explained earlier, a high payout
ratio reduces the initial loan’s repayment obligation and therefore attenuates the asset-
substitution moral hazard. From this point on, I will set γ equal to 1. This assumption may
seem counterintuitive at first because lenders usually impose debt covenants that limit
cash disbursements to shareholders. However, in a relationship-lending setting, a large
dividend implies a larger borrowing and therefore more profit for the bank. I also assume18
that the borrower precommits itself to this dividend policy. That is, after promising the
bank a 100% dividend payout at time 1 (which implies high third-period borrowing and
high expected profit for the bank in that period) and obtaining a low price for the initial
loan, the borrower cannot invest the cash flows from the initial project in the equity of the
second project and reduce the third-period borrowing. I rewrite (3’) as
D1,S = S I M
I
) 1 ( 0 − −φ
θ
(3’’)
The next result explains how a spot loan deals with the asset substitution moral
hazard.
Proposition 1: (i) The borrower always takes the safe project and the bank is

















c φ  is decreasing in the market power (M) and the fraction of good borrowers
(θ).
Proof: The price of the loan, D1, must be sufficiently low to induce the borrower
to invest in the safe project and sufficiently high to compensate the bank;




















































The first part of this result simply states that the spot loan market exists if the loan
price is feasible. Note that the price is feasible for any D1 such that  S D , 1 ≤ D1 ≤. B D , 1
Infeasibility implies  B D , 1 ≤ S D , 1 . If the exploitability probability is too low, the price at
which the bank can recover the cost of the initial loan induces the borrower to take the
risky project. The bank anticipates this action and refuses to lend because the risky
project has negative NPV. So, although the borrower is indifferent to the information
exploitability (as shown in (4)), exploitability determines the fraction of the costs that can
be transferred into the future where they do not affect the borrower’s project choice.
Therefore, the borrower is indifferent to exploitability as long as it can be induced to take
the safe project. Otherwise, the bank refuses to lend and the borrower makes zero profit.
The intuition of the second part is that when the bank’s market power is high, it can
recapture the loss due to competitive pricing by extracting a larger share of the future
surplus. By the same token, when θ is large, less money is wasted because of the bad
borrower and current rents are sufficient to cover the subsidy at low φ values.
Before concluding this section, I’d like to point out that in the absence of
information-producing bank-borrower relationships (φ=0, the bank learns nothing useful
about the borrower), the loan market always fails. Relationships alleviate this market
failure by reducing competitive pressures. Nevertheless, note that  S
c φ  is always positive.20
That is, although relationships reduce rationing, the market may still fail with positive
probability when information exploitability is low.
B. Loan Commitments
A loan commitment is an option. This implies that after the borrower purchases
the loan commitment, it is under no obligation to use it. Therefore, it is free to borrow
from the spot market if it can get credit.
After purchasing a loan commitment at time –1, a spot loan from another bank at
date 0 costs the borrower D1,S, the same repayment obligation as in (3’’).
The incumbent bank prices the loan under commitment by taking into account the
possibility that the borrower may get a spot loan from a competitor with probability qm. If
the borrower receives an offer from a competitor at time 0, the bank gives the borrower a
spot loan that carries the same terms as a loan that can be obtained from another bank in
the spot market. The bank’s zero expected profit condition becomes
[ ] C I I M D q D q S LC m S m + = − + − + 0 , 1 , 1 ) 1 (   ) 1 (   φ θ (7)
Rearranging (7), I obtain the repayment obligation of the loan made under
commitment.
D1,LC = S I M
C I








(7') shows that the loan made under commitment is always more expensive than a
spot loan due to the liquidity-carrying costs. The next proposition explains how this
affects the contract choice at time 0.21
Proposition 2: At time 0, borrowers always prefer the spot loan over the loan
made under commitment when credit is available.
Proof: At time 0, after the borrower observes that credit is available in the spot
market, its profit from the spot loan is
borrower
S , 0 Π =θ  (S1+S2 – 
θ
0 I
− IS)( 8 )
Similarly, the profit from the commitment loan is
borrower
LC , 0 Π =θ  (S1+S2 – 
θ
C I + 0 − IS)( 9 )
Clearly, (8)>(9). When the funding guarantee advantage of the loan commitment
becomes obsolete, the spot loan is preferred because it is cheaper. ￿
The intuition is that when credit is costlessly available in the spot market, the
uncertainty about credit availability is resolved and the funding guarantee of the loan
commitment has no advantage to the borrower. Moreover, borrowing under commitment
entails the payment of the bank’s liquidity costs. Therefore, the borrower always uses the
spot loan irrespective of its contract choice at time –1. Note that the bank can charge a
usage fee to the borrower for not using the loan commitment and prevent it from
switching to a spot loan. However, the bank cannot benefit from this action because in a
competitive market, it has to compensate the borrower for the usage fee by reducing the
loan interest rate. Since the bank is indifferent ex ante, I assume that it does not charge
the usage fee.
The liquidity costs also affect the extent to which loan commitments can prevent
asset-substitution moral hazard. The next proposition explains this argument.22
Proposition 3: The borrower always takes the safe project and the bank is willing
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Proof: The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1. D1 must satisfy



















Proposition 3 shows that the liquidity-carrying costs reduce the usefulness of loan
commitments relative to spot loans in attenuating moral hazard at low information
exploitability probabilities because the bank’s future rents are not enough to carry these
costs into the future where they do not affect project choice.
With a loan commitment the borrower’s expected profit at time –1 becomes
borrower
LC , 1 − Π =θ  (S1 – qm D1,S – (1−qm) D1,LC + borrower
3 Π )
                                = θ  (S1+S2 – 
θ
C I + 0 − IS) (11)
The next proposition compares (11) to the borrower’s expected profit with a spot
loan, (4), and reveals the conditions under which loan commitments dominate spot loans
at time –1.23
Proposition 4: If information exploitability is sufficiently large so that loan
commitments are feasible, loan commitments dominate spot loans at time –1, when
(i) the cost of delayed investment, α, is sufficiently large. In other words,
) ( ) 1 )( 1 ( 0
2 1 S m b I
I
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(ii) the liquidity in the spot market is sufficiently low. In other words,
) (  
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where λ=() ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 b m q q − − −  is the probability that liquidity will be
immediately available at time 0.
Proof: (i) Loan commitments are preferred over spot loans at time –1, if
borrower
LC , 1 − Π >
borrower
S , 1 − Π (14)
Rearranging terms and solving for α, I obtain
) ( ) 1 )( 1 ( 0
2 1 S m b I
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(ii) Similar to part (i), I solve (14) for the probability of immediately obtaining
liquidity in the spot market which I label as λ= () ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 b m q q − − −  and obtain
) (  
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λ .  ￿24
Proposition 4(i) explains that as the credit market competition increases,
borrowers prefer loan commitments despite their higher cost because rationing becomes
more damaging. To see the intuition behind part (ii), note that an increase in the share of
rents lost to competitors, α, increases the right-hand side of (13). That is, in an
increasingly competitive product market, although an increase in liquidity reduces the
importance of the funding guarantee, the simultaneous increase in the losses to
competitors ensures that the loan commitment is still the preferred contract.
To clarify the discussion so far, let me recapitulate the difference between the
results in propositions  2 and 4. Proposition 4 deals with the choice at time –1 between
purchasing a loan commitment and waiting for the future spot market while proposition 2
dealt with the choice at time 0 between borrowing from the spot market and using the
loan commitment purchased earlier. The choice at time 0 depended only on fund
availability in the spot market because commitment loans are always more expensive
than spot loans. At time –1, the expected loss to competitors must be sufficiently high to
validate the high cost of loan commitments and the bank must be willing to lend with a
loan commitment given the threat of moral hazard.
My results so far are based on the implicit assumption that the bank that sells a
loan commitment always carries liquidity to honor its claim. The next proposition
clarifies and formalizes this assumption.
Proposition 5: In the absence of a legally enforceable commitment to lend, the
bank does not carry liquidity from date –1 to date 0 even if it is compensated for the cost
of carry.25
Proof: If the bank can credibly commit itself to lend, the borrower is willing to
take the initial loan at a repayment obligation of 
θ
C
D D S LC + = , 1 , 1 . Otherwise, the
borrower demands the lower repayment obligation of a spot loan D1,S.
If the bank can walk away from its commitment with legal impunity, it can
promise to lend, convince the borrower to accept D1,LC and not carry liquidity. In that
case, the bank makes an expected profit of $C (It expects to earn $C/θ from each
borrower with probability θ). Therefore, the bank must be legally bound or its
commitments will be worthless.  ￿
This result reflects a classic moral hazard problem. The bank takes an action after
its compensation is guaranteed. If the bank is compensated for the cost of carrying
liquidity, the compensation is adjusted in such a way that the bank makes zero expected
profit net of the liquidity-carrying cost. In that case, the bank prefers to take the
compensation and not carry liquidity because this guarantees a positive profit. Even if the
compensation is tied to the condition that the bank actually lends at time 0, the bank will
still make zero expected profit at time –1. Assuming that carrying liquidity is unverifiable
if the bank is not in a crunch, the bank will not carry liquidity and collect the
compensation if it has sufficient liquidity reserves to lend at time 0, leading to a positive
expected profit. Therefore, an explicit legally enforceable commitment to lend is
necessary to induce the bank to keep idle liquidity reserves
14.
In the next section, I extract the empirical implications of the analysis.26
III. Empirical Implications
Empirical Implication A: The first implication is a direct application of
proposition 3. When information exploitability is high, the model predicts a greater use of
loan commitments as long as the benefits of the funding guarantee are larger than the
liquidity-carrying costs. Information exploitability will be high when there are few
information producers for that borrower that would compete with the incumbent bank.
This leads to the following prediction.
Prediction #1: The use of loan commitments will be relatively low for firms that
have multiple banking relationships and for firms followed by a large number of analysts.
Empirical Implication B: This implication follows from proposition 4. If the
competition in the borrower’s product market is sufficiently high, we observe borrowers
who purchase loan commitments to protect themselves from rationing even in markets
where liquidity is increasing but prefer not to use them when credit is available in the
spot market. This leads to the following prediction.
Prediction 2: If the competition in the product market is increasing over time,
borrowers will insure a larger share of their future funding needs with loan
commitments.
Prediction 3: Borrowers who purchased loan commitments to protect themselves
from rationing will switch to spot loans when credit is available. Hence, the takedown
fraction will decline with increasing liquidity (and vice versa).
Figures 5 and 6 provide evidence in support of these predictions.
[Figures 5 and 6 go about here]27
Figure 5 shows that in the 90s, the rate of growth in loan commitment purchases
exceeded the rate of growth in total loan demand. I explain this by the borrowers’ desire
to insure a larger fraction of their funding needs in the increasingly competitive product
markets of the 90s.
As predicted by my model, Figure 6 shows that borrowers use a smaller fraction
of their credit limits (i.e. the takedown fraction declines) when banks relax their lending
requirements and make spot loans more accessible. When they tighten, loan commitment
usage goes up. The correlation is 75 percent.
IV. Model Robustness and Discussion
An important assumption in this paper is that borrowers do not have an initial
endowment that they can invest in equity. Clearly, an equity investment would reduce
moral hazard by putting the borrower’s own money at risk. Note that as long as the initial
endowment is less than the initial cost of the project, the presence of the bank loan will
create moral hazard. The main difference between my results and the results with equity
investment is that the latter will allow the bank to lend money at relatively lower
exploitability probabilities. Hence, more positive-NPV projects will receive funding.
Also, similar to Boot, Thakor and Udell (1987), the borrower’s initial endowment
can be used to pay the bank a commitment fee when the contract is signed. The fee can
be used to pay the bank’s liquidity-carrying costs without affecting the borrower’s project
choice. The intuition is that the borrower chooses its project after purchasing the loan
commitment and paying the fee. At that point in time, the fee is a sunk cost and does not
affect the borrower’s incentives. Note that because of the bank’s zero expected profit28
condition, the fee payment will reduce the price of the initial loan so that the bank is
indifferent to the fee payment ex ante. The resulting lower interest rate allows borrowers
with low information exploitability probabilities to benefit from the funding guarantee of
the loan commitment. Hence, the existence of an initial endowment and the payment of a
commitment fee makes the loan commitment available to a greater spectrum of
borrowers. The results of this paper are still valid as long as the initial endowment is not
enough to fully cover the bank’s liquidity carrying costs. In that case, the loan
commitment will always be more expensive than a spot loan and borrowers with
sufficiently low information exploitability probabilities will switch to risky projects when
they finance their investment with a loan commitment.
Another important assumption of this paper is that bank loans are the only source
of funding. The reason why borrowers choose bank loans over other forms of financing is
described in various papers. (Diamond (1991), Rajan (1992), Berlin and Mester (1992)).
One of the key advantages of a bank loan is that banks can attenuate asset-substitution
moral hazard by subsidizing the borrower at the beginning and recovering the subsidy
later in the future by sharing the project’s surplus. This is efficient because back-loaded
state contingent interest payments are less distortionary than front-loaded fixed interest
payments. It is for this reason that outside equity, for example, is dominated by a the
bank loan in this setting. Equity does not allow the lender to extract cash from the firm
because dividend payments are voluntary. Public debt is also dominated by the bank loan
because of the impossibility of spreading interest costs over time. Moreover, if the
borrower does not have a well-established reputation, equity or public debt issues may be
prohibitively costly.29
In the third period, however, the borrower is free to choose its funding source if
the bank’s information is not exploitable. I implicitly assume that investors in capital
markets cannot obtain the bank’s information and therefore cannot compete with the bank
in the last period. However, as documented by Best and Zhang (1993) there are various
information producers in the market other than the prospective lender, such as financial
analysts and investment banks that have relationships with the firm or other commercial
banks that the firm has deposits with. The private information that the prospective lender
will obtain from the borrower may also be revealed to these information producers. In my
analysis, I assumed that when the bank does not have an informational advantage, it can
always match the competitors’ offers because it is competing only with banks and all
banks are identical. When we allow for public debt, for example, bank loans may be too
expensive for a borrower whose quality is well-established in the market. Then, the bank
may be unable to offer a sufficiently low price and lose the customer. It can be shown
that the risk of losing business to non-bank competitors reduces the bank’s incentive to
offer relationship loans (commitment or spot). However, the intuition that governs the
choice between spot loans and loan commitments is unaffected.
The last assumption that I will discuss in this section is that borrowers cannot
pledge any collateral. It has been shown in the literature that collateral plays two
important roles: First, it can be used to alleviate credit rationing due to pre-contractual
informational asymmetries because it can be used to sort the privately-informed
borrowers in a separating equilibrium. (See, for example, Bester (1985), Besanko and
Thakor (1987)). In my model, there is no pre-contractual informational asymmetry, so
adverse selection is not an issue. Second, collateral can also be used to attenuate moral30
hazard  even though monitoring and repossessing the asset are costly because the
borrower loses the collateralized asset only if it defaults and default probability depends
on the borrower’s actions. (See Bester (1987), Chan and Thakor (1987), Boot, Thakor
and Udell (1991)). In my model, having a collateralizeable asset would lessen moral
hazard and reduce rationing (reduce  S
c φ and  LC
c φ ). This would, in turn, reduce the
importance of bank loans and make capital markets a non-negligible competitor. As I
previously explained in this section, the same results would go through.
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper illuminates two stylized facts about bank loan commitments.
According to the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank
Lending (1988), guarantee against being rationed is the most important reason for buying
loan commitments. My analysis rationalizes loan commitments as a guarantee against
future rationing.
Data show that as the loan maturity shrinks so does loan commitment use. My
model explains this by showing that loan commitment demand is increasing in the
exploitability of the information about the borrower. A short-maturity loan (or a short-
term relationship) does not give the bank sufficient time to investigate the borrower and
obtain exploitable information. Low exploitability implies broader use of spot loans.
The empirical predictions of the model are as follows:
•  The use of loan commitments will be low for firms that have multiple banking
relationships.31
•  The use of loan commitments will be low for firms followed by a large
number of analysts.
•  Borrowers who purchased loan commitments to protect themselves from
rationing will switch to spot loans when credit is available and the takedown
fraction will decline with increasing liquidity.
The current research still leaves some interesting questions unanswered. For
example, Federal Reserve Release E.2. shows that loan commitments are more likely to
be subject to prepayment penalties and are less likely to be secured with collateral. The
relationship between the fact that the loan is made under commitment and other contract
parameters remains to be understood.32
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Footnotes
1 The fee structure can include a commitment fee which is an upfront fee paid when the
commitment is made, an annual (service) fee which is paid on the borrowed amount and a
usage fee which is levied on the available unused credit.
2 FDIC bank data
3 Neither do they provide protection against the changes in the borrower’s default risk.
The bank may renege on its commitment by invoking the MAC clause if the borrower’s
financial condition deteriorates.
4 The Material Adverse Change clause allows banks to escape their legal liability, but this
has to do with a decline in the borrower’s financial condition not the bank’s liquidity.
5 The case of adverse selection is very similar. Banks cannot distinguish between
privately informed credit applicants with different risk attributes, an increase in interest
rates drives safer borrowers out of the credit market and makes the applicant pool riskier.
6 A similar structure is in Petersen and Rajan (1995)
7 This assumption is not critical. It allows us to concentrate our attention on the first
period.
8 See section 5 for a discussion of this and other critical assumptions.37
                                                                                                                                                
9 Clearly, the firm could spread repayments of the initial loan between date 1 and date 2.
Since the discount rate is zero, the short-term lending assumption has no effect on the
results.
10 When I refer to the repayment obligation of the second-period loan in general without
referring to the contract type, I will drop the {S, LC} subscripts and use D1.
11 It is possible to make a similar assumption on the bank’s fund availability at date 1 for
the third-period loan. However, this assumption does not have a significant contribution
to the results and is omitted to simplify the model. So, I assume that the bank will have
enough funds at time 1 independent from the fund availability at time 0.
12 Otherwise, the borrower is more likely to find credit from a different bank and
therefore will not contract with the incumbent bank in the first place. This is not a critical
assumption.
13 Because credit is available in the spot market at time 1, there is no need for loan
commitments in the final period.
14 Banks have a regulatory obligation to keep capital reserves against their loan
commitment obligations. However, these reserves are not sufficient to cover a bank’s
entire commitment portfolio. Therefore, a commitment is needed to induce the bank to



















































































































Figure 1. Historical data on loan maturity and loan commitment use. Floating-rate
loans are assumed to have 0-maturity. Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release
E.2.39
Figure 2. A comparison of banks lending standards with loan commitment
takedown. A negative percentage implies that the lending standards were relaxed.
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% of C&I loans made under commitment40































Figure 4. The sequence of events and the information structure
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = -1
-B o r r o w e r s  c h o o s e
between a spot loan
and a loan commitment.
- The bank cannot observe
the borrower’s type
and the borrower does
not know it either. 
Common knowledge is
that the borrower is
good with probability θ.
- The bank knows the
probability, φ, that the
information it acquires
in the second period will
be exploitable at date 1.
- Borrowers invest I0 by
obtaining credit from the
loan commitmentorthe
spot market if available.
- Borrowers learn their
type after investing I0.
- Banks continue to be
uninformed about the
borrowers’ types.
- Good borrowers choose
between projects after they
take the loan. Bad borrowers
also take down the loan.
However, these loans are
only invested in negative
NPV projects.
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bank loses its advantage.
- Terminal payoffs
are realized.
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Figure 6. A comparison of the level of banks’ credit standards to the usage rate of
loan commitments.